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8. 
Judging the JAC: How Much Judicial Influence Over Judicial Appointments Is Too 
Much? 
Graham Gee* 
 
Introduction 
 
Judicial involvement in judicial appointments is valuable. Judges possess unique perspectives 
on the qualities required for judicial office as well as the needs of the judicial system. Such 
perspectives should help to shape individual selections as well as the aims, priorities and 
structures of the selection regime as a whole. Hence, the pertinent question is not whether 
judges should exercise influence, but how much, what sorts and at which stages of the 
appointment process. To my mind, these are amongst the most challenging questions with 
which those responsible for designing, operating or scrutinizing a judicial selection regime 
must grapple. Questions such as these will give rise to rival and opposing views, not only at 
the time at which a new appointment regime is introduced, but also periodically thereafter, as 
and when experience suggests that judges exercise too little influence or too much. During the 
-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV&RPPLVVLRQ¶V-$&ILUVWGHFDGHhowever, there has been only 
relatively muted discussion of these questions. A handful of academics have argued that 
judges today exercise too much influence.1 However, their concerns are not widely shared by 
                                                        
*
 This chapter draws on confidential interviews conducted between 2011-14 with many of those 
involved in the judicial selection process in England and Wales. These interviews were part of a project 
funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/H039554/1). These were augmented by a 
further round of interviews conducted between 2015-17 with senior judges, officials at the Ministry of 
Justice and officiDOVDQGFRPPLVVLRQHUVDWWKH-$&7KH6RFLHW\RI/HJDO6FKRODUV¶5HVHDUFK$FWLYLWLHV
Fund supported this second round of interviews. I am very grateful to the interviewees and for 
comments on this paper from participants at the following conferences: The Paradox of Judicial 
Independence at the Institute of Government (July 2015); Judicial Appointments in an Age of Diversity 
at the University of Birmingham (November 2015); and the International Legal Ethics Conference VII 
at Fordham Law School (July 2016). 
1
 6HHHJ**HH5+D]HOO.0DOOHVRQDQG32¶%ULHQ, The Politics of Judicial Independence in the 
8.¶V&KDQJLQJ&RQVWLWXWLRQ, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015; and A. Paterson and C. 
Paterson, Guarding the Guardians: Towards an Independent, Accountable and Diverse Senior 
Judiciary, London: CentreForum, 2012. Concerns were also hinted at in S. Shetreet and S. Turenne, 
Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the English Judiciary, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 116.  
**HH¶-XGJLQJWKH-$&+RZ0XFK,QIOXHQFH2YHU-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV,V7RR0XFK"·LQG. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial 
Appointments in an Age of Diversity (Routledge, 2017) 
  
  
judges, politicians, officials or lawyers.2 Or more bluntly put: several stakeholders²and the 
JAC and the senior judiciary in particular²seem wholly unconvinced by academic critiques 
that judges now possess too much sway over appointments.3  
 
5HDFWLRQVWRDERRNWKDW5REHUW+D]HOO.DWH0DOOHVRQ3DWULFN2¶%ULHQDQG,SXEOLVKHGLQ
2015 are emblematic. Drawing on interviews with over two dozen individuals closely 
involved in JAC-run processes, our book identified the basic dynamic at the heart of the 
VHOHFWLRQUHJLPHLQVWLWXWHGXQGHUWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5HIRUP$FWWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU¶V
relative retreat from both individual appointment decisions and the day-to-day running of the 
appointment regime as a whole has been offset by the growing influence of judges, and senior 
judges in particular.4 We explained how, in addition to seven judicial commissioners who 
serve on the fifteen-member JAC, judges perform vital roles from the very beginning to the 
very end of the selection process. They shape job descriptions, design qualifying tests and 
role-playing tasks, supply references, sit on selection panels, provide views as statutory 
consultees on shortlisted candidates, and²for 95 per cent of vacancies²make the ultimate 
decision whether to appoint the person recommended by the JAC. We argued that the high 
levels of judicial influence that are engineered by statute throughout the appointments regime 
are reinforced in practice by the fact that judges, as repeat players, are adept at using 
additional selection criteria5 and statutory consultation6 to ensure that considerable weight is 
                                                        
2
 There have been at least eight formal reviews of judicial appointments over the last ten years, but not 
one contained a sustained discussion of the possibility that judges now exercise too much influence. 
The eight reviews are: (i) the Nooney Review (2007), an internal review of the JAC processes with the 
stated intention of increasing efficiency (ii) the LEAN Review (2008), a further internal review of 
-$&¶VSURFHVVHVZLWKWKHVWDWHGJRDORILQFUHDVLQJHIILFLHQF\LLLWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5HQHZDOBill 
(20008), later the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, where draft clauses sought to give the 
Lord Chancellor further controls over the JAC but were later dropped; (iv) the Advisory Panel on 
Judicial Diversity established by Jack Straw and led by Baroness Neuberger; (v) an End-to-End 
Review of the Appointments Process (2010) established by the Ministry of Justice; (vi) the House of 
/RUGV&RQVWLWXWLRQ&RPPLWWHH¶V,QTXLU\LQWR-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV-2012); (vii) the Ministry of 
-XVWLFH¶VFRQVultation on judicial appointments (2011), culminating in the Crime and Courts Act 2013; 
DQGYLLLWKH0LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFH¶V7ULHQQLDl Review of the JAC (2014-2015). 
3
 It is not only the JAC and senior judges who have given these academic critiques short shrift, but civil 
servants as well. See e.g. Ministry of Justice, Triennial Review: Judicial Appointments Commission 
(2015) paras 119-120. Practitioners are generally unmoved by the critique as well, but for a rary 
contrary perspective see the essay in this collection by Karon Monaghan QC. 
4
 Gee et al, The Politics of Judicial Independence, p. 159-193. 
5
 That is to say, additional criteria not stipulated in statute relating to the experience or qualifications 
that applicants for a given post should possess. Typical is a requirement that candidates for a salaried 
**HH¶-XGJLQJWKH-$&+RZ0XFK,QIOXHQFH2YHU-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV,V7RR0XFK"·LQG. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial 
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attached to their preferences. Our critique was that progress on diversifying the judiciary risks 
remaining fairly slow in a system with high levels of judicial influence given that judges 
might favour²whether consciously or not²candidates from conventional professional 
backgrounds (e.g. the bar and commercial practice). One reason for this is that judges might 
attach more weight to the professional experience that a candidate has accrued and less 
weight on his or her potential to develop into an excellent judge. My co-authors and I were in 
little doubt that most judges today accept that the lack of diversity is a problem and are 
genuine in their concern to remedy it,7 but we argued that despite this they had resisted or 
diluted initiatives that might have led to faster transformation of the bench. Following the 
ERRN¶VSXEOLFDWLRQWKH-$&VHYHUDOVHQLRUMXGJHVDQGa number of officials made it very 
clear to us that they viewed our critique about judicial influence and its implications for 
diversity as wrong. Several did not mince their words when conveying just how wrong they 
considered it. 
 
These reactions have given me considerable pause for thought over the last two years. It 
would be odd if they had not. I have reflected, in particular, on the difficulties of conducting 
research in this area.8 It is tricky for outsiders such as academics to capture accurately and 
then to make sense of all of the various institutional dynamics at play in the long and formal 
processes run by the JAC, where a changing cast of characters participate in different types of 
vacancies. It is true that the post-2005 processes managed by the JAC are now much more 
WUDQVSDUHQWWKDQWKHWUDGLWLRQDOµWDSRQWKHVKRXOGHU¶DSSURDFKDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH/RUG
&KDQFHOORU¶V'HSDUWPHQW9 but inevitably all of the most important interactions still occur out 
                                                                                                                                                              
judicial office should have fee-paid judicial experience (i.e. experience sitting in part-time, fee-paid 
judicial roles while continuing in their day jobs). 
6
 That is to say, a requirement imposed on the JAC to consult with certain officeholders (usually senior 
judges) before it selects a candidate to recommend to the appointing authority.  
7
 7KHQHHGIRUDPRUHGLYHUVHMXGLFLDU\KDVµEHFRPHDWUXWKDOPRVWXQLYHUVDOO\DFNQRZOHGJHG¶HYHQ
ZKLOVWSURJUHVVUHPDLQVVORZ(5DFNOH\µ5HWKLQNLQJ-XGLFLDO'LYHUVLW\¶LQ86KXOW]DQG*6KDZ
(eds) Gender and Judging, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, pp. 501, 503. For a more sceptical take, see 
+6RPPHUODGµ-XGLFLDO'LYHUVLW\&RPSOH[LW\&RQWLQXLW\DQG&KDQJH¶LQWKLVFROOHFWLRQ 
8
 Similar difficulties are discussed in A. Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the 
Supreme Court, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, pp. 5-9. 
9
 For a comprehensive account of the pre-2005 approach to judicial appointments, see Lord Mackay, 
µ6HOHFWLRQRI-XGJHV3ULRUWRWKH(VWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV&RPPLVVLRQLQ¶LQ
Judicial Appointments Commission, Judicial Appointments: Balancing Independence, Accountability 
and Legitimacy, London: Judicial Appointments Commission, 2010; D. Woodhouse, The Office of 
**HH¶-XGJLQJWKH-$&+RZ0XFK,QIOXHQFH2YHU-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV,V7RR0XFK"·LQG. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial 
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of sight and behind closed doors. Rendering research even more challenging are the very fluid 
dynamics between judges, ministers, civil servants and lay people,10 with relationships ebbing 
and flowing over even fairly short timeframes as pivotal officeholders enter and depart the 
stage.11 Any analysis of the influence of this or that actor can therefore quickly become out of 
date. Complicating matters further is that the ways in which actors exercise influence, as well 
as the degrees to which they do so, can reveal contradictory patterns. For example, actors 
whose interests are assumed to conflict might find that their interests coalesce at certain 
points in a selection process,12 or actors might have excessive influence over some, but not all, 
levels of appointments.13 It follows that critiques about overly high levels of influence might 
hold true for some vacancies but not others, or might have been true at one point in time, but 
not now. All of this is to acknowledge the real risk that academic critiques of judicial 
influence might be outdated, overstated or simply wrong, whether in whole or in part. 
 
This is one possible explanation for why the JAC and some senior judges have rejected 
academic concerns about judicial influence over judicial appointments. There are others of 
course, including individual and institutional incentives that might lead some stakeholders to 
neglect, dismiss or downplay such concerns. In particular, senior judges might not wish to 
disturb a regime under which they exercise significant say over the composition of the bench, 
while the JAC might not wish to acknowledge the limits on either the ability or willingness of 
its lay and legal commissioners to counteract the high levels of judicial influence that statute 
                                                                                                                                                              
Lord Chancellor, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 133-163; and P. Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: 
The Working Lives of Judges, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, pp. 90-95. 
10
 )RUDQRYHUYLHZVHH67XUHQQHµ-XGLFLDO,QGHSHQGHQFHLQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHVVLQFHWKH
Constitutional Reform AcW¶LQ$6HLEHUW-Fohr (ed) Judicial Independence in Transition²
Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OSCE Region, Berlin: Springer, 2012, p. 147.  
11
 6LQFHWKH-$&¶VFUHDWLRQLQWKHUHKDYHEHHQVL[/RUG&KDQFHOORUV/RUG)DOFRQHU-DFN6WUDZ
Ken Clarke, Christopher Grayling, Michael Gove and Liz Truss) three Lord Chief Justices (Lords 
Phillips, Judge and Thomas), three JAC chairs (Baroness Prashar, Christopher Stevens and Lord 
.DNNDUDQGWZRDFWLQJFKDLUV/RUGV7RXOVRQDQG%XUQHWWZLWKWKH-$&¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHMXGLFLDU\
and the government shaped in part by the occupants of these offices. 
12
 Tensions have often run high between the Ministry of Justice, the Courts Service and the judiciary on 
a range of issues relating to the funding of the judicial system as a whole (e.g. court closures), but they 
each share an interest in ensuring that the pHRSOHDSSRLQWHGWRMXGLFLDORIILFHDUHDEOHWRµKLWWKHJURXQG
UXQQLQJ¶)RUH[DPSOHVXFFHVVLYH/RUG&KDQFHOORUVDQG/RUG&KLHI-XVWLFHVKDYHVKDUHGLQVWLSXODWLQJ
non-statutory eligibility criteria concerning the expertise and experience needed for a given vacancy. 
See Gee et al, The Politics of Judicial Independence, pp. 171-173. 
13
 Particular concern has been expressed about levels of judicial influence over senior appointments: 
e.g. Paterson and Paterson, Guarding the Guardians. 
**HH¶-XGJLQJWKH-$&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weaves throughout the appointment process.14 I will not dwell on these explanations, even if 
some weight ought to be ascribed to them. I will consider instead another explanation: namely, 
WKHODFNRIVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJVDERXWZKDWLWPHDQVWRWDONRIµMXGLFLDOLQIOXHQFH¶0\
suspicion is that this contributes to a mismatch between how some academics on the one hand 
and some judges and the JAC on the other assess judicial involvement in the selection process. 
A lack of shared understandings about the meaning of judicial influence has made it 
challenging to foster a constructive debate about whether judges now exercise excessive 
influence. Part of the problem is that there has been no sustained examination in England and 
Wales or (so far as I am aware) any other common law jurisdiction of what is meant in this 
context by judicial influence.15 We need an account of influence that covers the manifold and 
sometimes subtle ways in which judges are involved in shaping individual appointment 
decisions and the overarching appointments regime. We also need a basic framework to help 
us to evaluate how much and what sorts of influence judges should exercise and at which 
stages of the selection process. Absent such a framework, we are reduced to making claims 
about there being too much, too little or just the right amount of influence on the basis of little 
more than mere intuitions.16 
 
This chapter represents the first attempt to identify a broad framework within which to assess 
judicial influence over appointments in England and Wales. It applies to other jurisdictions in 
proportion to the degree to which their selection processes and²more significantly²their 
political and legal cultures resemble those found here. I divide the chapter into three parts. 
First, to structure debate about such an intricate phenomenon, I suggest that influence is 
understood to include both conduct-shaping (i.e. affecting individual decisions) and context-
shaping (i.e. affecting the environment in which decisions are made). Conduct-shaping and 
context-shaping are variable and relational, which in turn can make it very difficult to 
determine the actual levels of influence that judges exercise. Second, I explain how reflecting 
                                                        
14
 See generally the discussion of the complex motivations and attendant relationships between the 
stakeholders involved in the new selection processes: E. Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: 
From Difference to Diversity, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 76-105. 
15
 In continental systems there is slightly more (albeit still relatively scant) discussion of how judicial 
influence over promotions are heightened through Judicial Councils: see e.g. N. Garoupa and T. 
*LQVEXUJµ7KH&RPSDUDWLYH/DZDQG(FRQRPLFVRI-XGLFLDO&RXQFLOV¶Berkley Journal of 
International Law SDQG&*XDUQLHULµ$SSRLQWPHQWDQG&DUHHURI-XGJHVLQ&RQWLQHQWDO
Europe: The Rise of Judicial Self-*RYHUQPHQW¶Legal Studies 24, 2004, p. 169. 
16
 See e.g. 6RSKLH7XUHQQH¶VUHYLHZRIRXUERRNZKLFKULJKWly noted the lack of an explicit framework 
DJDLQVWZKLFKWRHYDOXDWHFODLPVRIGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHMXGLFLDOLQIOXHQFH67XUHQQHµ5HYLHZ¶
Cambridge Law Journal 75, 2016, p. 437. 
**HH¶-XGJLQJWKH-$&+RZ0XFK,QIOXHQFH2YHU-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV,V7RR0XFK"·LQG. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial 
Appointments in an Age of Diversity (Routledge, 2017) 
  
  
on the inputs, outputs and throughputs of an appointments regime provides a basic framework 
for determining when judicial influence becomes too high. Such a framework must recognise 
the indispensable insights that judges have to share about individual selection decisions and 
the working of the selection regime as a whole, and which by extension justify some measure 
of influence over judicial appointments. At the same time, it should also identify appropriate 
limits on the amount of influence that judges enjoy. In doing all of this, it must help us to 
assess whether the inputs, outputs and throughputs of the selection regime work to adequately 
promote core values such as transparency, accountability and inclusiveness. Third, it is 
against this background that I then offer five presumptions to help to assess whether, all 
things considered, judges enjoy too much, too little or just the right amount of influence. 
Informing these presumptions is the belief that judicial involvement in the appointments 
regime must be, so far as possible, structured, open and subject to effective safeguards. I use 
these presumptions to assess the JAC regime. Developing, deepening and in some respects 
departing from the critique that my co-authors and I advanced in 2015, I point to important 
progress made on structuring several instances of judicial involvement. However, I argue that 
judicial influence within the regime managed by the JAC nevertheless still far exceeds what is 
desirable.  
 
What is Judicial Influence? 
At one level, judicial influence has an obvious meaning. It denotes the capacity of judges to 
shape individual appointments, overarching policies or otherwise to ensure favourable 
treatment of their interests within the appointments regime. At another level, however, careful 
reflection reveals judicial influence to be an intricate phenomenon not reducible to a snappy 
and straightforward definition. Part of the reason for this is that judicial influence is likely to 
manifest in a great variety of different ways. Influence is likely to exhibit many different 
patterns, with a wide range of judges (tribunal judges and court judges, low-level judges and 
senior judges) contributing in different capacities (as referees, interviewers, commissioners, 
the appointing authority) and at various stages of the selection process (short-listing, 
interview, final decision and so forth). Over and above this, there is good reason to suppose 
that the professional authority enjoyed by judges, and especially senior judges, transfigures 
into powerful social forces that significantly shape the actions and decisions of other actors in 
the appointments regime, such as ministers and civil servants at the Ministry of Justice or the 
legal and lay commissioners on the JAC.17 A comprehensive account would address a number 
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 On the important relationship between authority and influence, see R. Cialdini, Influence: The 
Psychology of Persuasion, London: Collins, 2007, (revised edn). First published in 1984. On the social 
**HH¶-XGJLQJWKH-$&+RZ0XFK,QIOXHQFH2YHU-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV,V7RR0XFK"·LQG. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial 
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of related questions such as: which judges, or groups of judges, exercise influence? Over 
whom or what? Through what means, channels or processes? To the extent that judges exert 
influence over other actors, do those actors resist or acquiesce? Do those other actors identify 
themselves as subject to judicial influence? Are judges conscious of the many ways in which 
they can and perhaps do exercise influence? What factors shape the ways in and degrees to 
which judges do so? And to what ends do judges exercise influence? In addressing questions 
such as these, it is helpful to view influence as extending to both conduct-shaping and 
context-shaping.18  
 
Most people when referring to judicial influence likely have in mind the former. Conduct-
shaping refers to the capacity of judges to translate their preferences into concrete decisions. 
On issues where there is broad consensus, judges might have to exert little or no influence to 
ensure that their preferences are reflected in actual decisions. On other issues, it might involve 
convincing other actors to decide something at odds with their own interests in order to 
vindicate strongly held judicial preferences. In its strongest expression, in other words, 
conduct-VKDSLQJLQIOXHQFHHPEUDFHVMXGJHV¶FDSDFLW\WRDIIHFWGLUHFWO\WKHGHFLVLRQV and 
behaviour of other actors. Conduct-shaping is an important aspect of influence, but it is far 
from straightforward to evaluate the ability of judges to convert preferences into real world 
decisions. There are, after all, multiple decisions to make in any one selection exercise 
(specifying the job description; designing qualifying tests; short-listing applicants; deciding 
whether to provide a reference and what to include in it; picking the questions to pose during 
the interview; and so forth).19 These decisions will not be of equal significance, with 
important decisions the responsibility of different decision-makers or, in some instances, 
different combinations of decisions-makers. As I explain towards the end of this chapter, 
most (albeit not all) RIWKHNH\GHFLVLRQVLQWKH-$&¶VSURFHVVHVLQYROYHRQHRUPRUHMXGJHV
In addition, preferences are not necessarily uniform. They might vary between judges at 
different levels of the bench, and even between judges who sit on the same court. Even a 
                                                                                                                                                              
LPSDFWRILQIOXHQFHVHHJHQHUDOO\%/DWDQHµ7KH3V\FKRORJ\RI6RFLDO,PSDFW¶American 
Psychologist 36, 1981, p. 343. 
18
 I borrow the distinction between conduct-shaping and context-VKDSLQJIURP&ROLQ+D\¶VZRUNRQ
SRZHU&+D\µ'LYLGHGE\D&RPPRQ/DQJXDJH3ROLWLFDO7KHRU\DQGWKH&RQFHSWRI3RZHU¶
Politics 17, 1997, p. 45. 
19
 These are examples of only the most obvious formal (and the more visible) decisions in a selection 
process. There is also a range of informal (and the less visible) decisions. An example of the latter is 
the need for the JAC to decide how much weight to ascribe to the judicial views on shortlisted 
applicants that have been obtained during statutory consultation.  
**HH¶-XGJLQJWKH-$&+RZ0XFK,QIOXHQFH2YHU-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV,V7RR0XFK"·LQG. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial 
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relatively homogenous group such as the senior judiciary might have multiple preferences 
that are held with varying strength. 
 
Context-VKDSLQJLVMXGJHV¶LQGLUHFWLQIOXHQFHDQGFRYHUVWKHLUFDSDFLW\WRVKDSHWKHFRQWH[WLQ
which individual selection decisions are made. This includes, but is not limited to, the ability 
of judges to fashion the general policy environment relating to appointments. It also extends 
to less concrete influence such as the ability to create the values deemed essential for a well-
functioning appointment regime in ways that condition and limit the range of decisions that 
can be made. Closely related to what elsewhere in this collection Alan Paterson terms the 
MXGLFLDU\¶VµVRIWSRZHU¶20 context-shaping encompasses the ability to mould the assumptions 
that inform and underpin the decisions and actions of the main stakeholders in the selection 
regime. Influence is not only about direct impact on decisions, in other words. It is also about 
an indirect, systemic impact that shapes the issues that will arise for decision in the first 
place.21 Examples of judicial influence as context-shaping include the ability of judges to 
mould how other actors determine the weight to ascribe to legitimacy, accountability and 
diversity within the overall selection regime. It might also include the ability to shape the 
tenor of policy debates about²DQGE\H[WHQVLRQRWKHUVWDNHKROGHUV¶YLHZVRQ²issues such 
as whether to further dilute ministerial involvement in individual selection decisions22 or how 
µPHULW¶ relates to the experiences that an applicant should possess prior to appointment to the 
bench.23  
 
Of particular note is that the context-shaping influence that judges enjoy might be a byproduct 
of forces that neither they nor other stakeholders fully recognize or understand.24 At the same 
time, it might be the most important and perhaps even insidious form of influence inasmuch 
as it prevents significant issues from being seen as appropriate or pressing topics of debate. 
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 $3DWHUVRQµ3RZHUDQG-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQW6TXDULQJWKH,PSRVVLEOH&LUFOH¶LQWKLVFROOHFWLRQ 
21
 See generally S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edn, 2005. 
22
 It is notable, for example, that concern about curtailing ministerial and legislative involvement seems 
to loom large in most discussions of judicial appointments in the Commonwealth. See generally J. van 
Zyl Smit, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth Principles, London: 
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, 2015.  
23
 6HH0RULVRQ¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHFRQFHUQRIPDQ\VWDNHKROGHUVLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGWKDWMXGJHVKDYH
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7KHMXGLFLDU\¶VFRQWH[W-shaping influence might be presumed to be especially powerful given 
that, more so than other stakeholders, judges (and especially senior judges responsible for the 
deployment and performance of the judicial workforce) are likely to have a clear sense of 
how the selection regime should work and the outcomes that they want it to generate.25 On 
top of this senior judges are often in office for longer than their counterparts at the Ministry 
DQG-$&ZLWKWKLVFRQWLQXLW\HQDEOLQJWKHPWREHFRPHYHU\HIIHFWLYHµUHSHDWSOD\HUV¶ZKR
are adept at ensuring that their preferences are secured through the working of the selection 
processes. As accomplished advocates, judges are also likely to be effective in 
communicating their concerns to other stakeholders²and, indeed, might succeed in 
convincing other actors of the supposed soundness of otherwise ill-founded concerns. In its 
strongest expression, context-shaping influence might involve co-opting other stakeholders to 
IXUWKHUWKHMXGLFLDU\¶VVHOI-interest to the detriment of the public interest. An example would 
be if judicial commissioners on the JAC succeed in persuading its lay and legal 
FRPPLVVLRQHUVWRDFFHSWXQFULWLFDOO\WKHMXGLFLDU\¶VVWDQFHRQFRQWHQWLRXVTXHVWLRQVRI
policy.26 Another example would be where MXGJHVVXFFHHGLQµFXOWLYDW>LQJ@V\PSDthy or 
VXSSRUW¶27 among political elites.28 Arguably, the fact that there has been such little debate 
GXULQJWKH-$&¶VILUVWWHQ\HDUVDERXWMXGLFLDOLQIOXHQFHRYHUDSSRLQWPHQWVcould itself be an 
H[DPSOHRIWKHMXGJHV¶FRQWH[W-shaping influence.29  
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 6HH3DWHUVRQµ3RZHUDQG-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQW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26
 As discussed later in this chapter, judicial influence has been cited as a possible reason for why the 
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where there are two candidates of equal merit, there is nothing preventing the JAC from recommending 
a person for appointment on the basis of improving diversity on the bench. See also G. Gee and K. 
0DOOHVRQµ-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV'LYHUVLW\DQGWKH(TXDO0HULW3URYLVLRQ¶UK Constitutional Law 
Blog, 6 May 2014.  
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Conduct-shaping and context-shaping are related, and indeed often mutually-reinforcing. 
-XGJHV¶FDSDFLW\WRVKDSHSROLFLHVFDQUHLQIRUFHWKHLULQIOXHQFHRYHUGLVFUHWHGHFLVLRQVZKLOVW
the ability to shape concrete decisions can mould how other actors evaluate the policy context 
in which those decisions are made. The best example is, perhaps, the potential for judges to 
ensure²both at the level of discrete decisions and the level of general attitudes amongst key 
stakeholders²the dominance of traditional understandings of merit that emphasize advocacy, 
seniority, private practice at the bar and appearances before the higher courts. Merit, 
constructed in this way, not only unfairly advantages certain privileged groups;30 it also 
ensures considerable influence for senior judges inasmuch as it ascribes weight to experiences 
and skills visible primarily to judges in the higher courts, rather than other actors who 
participate in the selection process-XGJHV¶DELOLW\WRLQVLVWvia concrete decisions on 
traditional understandings of merit (i.e. conduct-shaping) reinforces the dominance of that 
understanding within the selection regime (i.e. context-shaping), which in turn will make it 
easier for the senior judiciary to serve as de facto µJDWHNHHSHUV¶RIPHULW, and therefore of the 
selection regime and entry into the judiciary more generally. 
 
Judicial Influence: Variable and Relational 
 
Judicial influence is likely to be both variable and relational. It is variable to the extent that 
both conduct-shaping and context-shaping will fluctuate depending on factors such as: the 
vacancy in question; the prevailing statutory framework; the personalities of officeholders; 
and the institutional relationships between the JAC, the Ministry of Justice and senior 
judiciary. That patterns ebb and flow over time and from vacancy to vacancy makes it 
challenging to reach a settled view on whether judges enjoy too much, too little or just the 
right amount of influence. This might lead to fairly fine-grained assessments. Several 
academics have expressed particular concern, for instance, about the high levels of judicial 
influence over senior judicial appointments (i.e. to the UK Supreme Court and leadership 
roles such as the Lord Chief Justice, Senior President of Tribunals and the heads of 
division).31 Even in respect of senior appointments, however, levels of influence have varied 
                                                                                                                                                              
consequence could be to render it much less likely that there is any debate about the levels of judicial 
influence. 
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 .0DOOHVRQµ5HWKLQNLQJWKH0HULW3ULQFLSOHLQ-XGLFLDO6HOHFWLRQ¶Journal of Law & Society 44, 
2006, pp. 126, 135-136. 
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 See e.g. A. Paterson, Lawyers and the Public Good: Democracy in Action?, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012, pp. 148-152. 
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over time. An example is the dilution of judicial involvement following changes in 2013 to 
DSSRLQWPHQWVWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW7KH&RXUW¶V'HSXW\3UHVLGHQWZDVUHPoved from the 
commissions specifically constituted for appointments to the Court, whilst the President and 
Deputy were removed from the process of selecting their successors.32 Another example is 
how the influence of senior judges over recruitment to lower level courts grew between 2010 
DQGGXULQJ.HQQHWK&ODUNH¶VWHQXUHDV/RUG&KDQFHOORUDIWHUKHLQGLFDWHGWKDWKHZRXOG
only appoint candidates recommended by the JAC who had been first approved by the Lord 
Chief Justice during statutory consultation.33 
 
In addition to being variable, judicial influence is also relational; that is to say, the influence 
of any one actor is related to and partly shaped by the influence exerted by other actors. This 
is especially important given that a striking feature of the post-2005 selection regime is its 
inclusiveness.34 The pre-2005 regime²although mixing political, judicial and practitioner 
influences, and while judges enjoyed significant sway through secret soundings²was 
dominated by the Lord Chancellor and a handful of officials.35 In a stark departure, the JAC 
oversees an open and inclusive regime that involves a variety of other actors. The Lord 
Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, assisted by officials from the Ministry of Justice and 
H.M. Courts and Tribunals Service, determine the job description for each vacancy. The 
panel that interviews and ranks candidates comprises a mix of judges and lay people, with the 
SDQHO¶VSUHFLVHFRPSRVLWion depending on the office. For certain appointments, senior judges 
                                                        
32
 See Schedule 13 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and the Supreme Court (Judicial Appointments) 
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must also be consulted, as required by statute.36 On the JAC a mix of lay, legal and judicial 
commissioners determine which candidates to recommend to one of the three decision-
makers who have the final say whether or not to appoint (i.e. the Lord Chancellor for all 
appointments to the High Court and above; the Lord Chief Justice for all lower level courts; 
and the Senior President of Tribunals for most tribunal posts).37 The fashioning of policy is 
also a much more collaborative enterprise, with roles for judicial associations, practitioner 
associations and Parliament. That the appointments landscape is so densely populated, with 
contributions from multiple stakeholders, reflects the fact that no one actor has a monopoly 
on all of the skills, information, resources or expertise necessary to reach well-rounded 
assessments of an applicant¶s suitability for a judicial career or, more generally, the effective 
pursuit of policy. The type and degree of influence that judges enjoy in an inclusive regime 
such as this necessarily depends on and is conditioned by the type and degree of influence 
enjoyed by other stakeholders. 
 
The suggestion, then, is that influence is a variable and relational phenomenon that 
encompasses conduct-shaping and context-shaping. The complexity of this phenomenon is 
one factor that renders it challenging to cultivate constructive debate about judicial influence 
over judicial appointments. It should already be plain that it can be difficult to reliably 
calibrate actual levels of conduct-shaping and context-shaping. To determine how effectively 
judges translate preferences into decisions (conduct-shaping influence) requires identifying 
those preferences and tracing them through each of the various decision points in the selection 
process. Both parts to this assessment might be hazardous. There are, as noted earlier, 
multiple decision points, with some more important than others, whilst preferences might 
vary between different judges, with some more effective in translating their most strongly 
held preferences into actual decisiRQV'LIILFXOWLHVZLWKJDXJLQJMXGJHV¶OHYHOVRILQIOXHQFH
are compounded in respect of context-shaping, where the extent to which judges moulds the 
general environment in which individual decisions are made, as well as the ways in which 
other actors regard that broad environment, is essentially unobservable, at least to outsiders. 
Furthermore, evaluating the conduct-shaping and context-shaping influence of judges in an 
inclusive selection regime involves evaluating the extent to which other actors contribute, 
with those contributions also likely to embrace context-shaping and conduct-shaping, with all 
of the same evidential difficulties. In an inclusive regime that involves contributions from 
multiple actors it can be tricky to filet out the influence of any given one of them. In line with 
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this, since it is difficult to isolate influence over individual selection decisions (conduct-
shaping) from their influence over the regime (context-shaping), it is necessary to arrive at an 
all-things-considered assessment that almost inevitably is no more than a rough 
approximation of the actual levels of judicial influence. All of this could be read as a counsel 
of despair, with any assessment of the influence exercised by judges so complicated that 
debate is not profitable. But it should not be read in this way. It should be read instead as 
underlining the importance of fostering informed, reflective and structured debate that is 
sensitive to this complexity.  
 
A Framework for Debating Judicial Influence  
One way to structure the debate about judicial influence is in terms of inputs, outputs and 
throughputs.38 Each provides a focus for reflecting on some of the core components of a 
normatively attractive appointments process. Inputs, in this context, direct us to reflect on the 
relationship between judicial influence and the decision-making processes that lead to 
individual selection decisions or the policies and structures of the selection regime.39 It 
encourages us to explore judicial involvement in light of who else contributes to decision-
making and the quality, degree and weight of their various contributions. Outputs encourage 
us to explore the relationships between judicial influence and the outcomes of the 
appointments regime. These include whether talented individuals from diverse backgrounds 
are appointed to judicial office and, more generally, whether the regime fosters confidence in 
the courts and tribunals. Throughputs overlap with and build on inputs and outputs as well as 
VKLQLQJDOLJKWRQZKDWRFFXUVµLQWKHVSDFHEHWZHHQ¶WKHWZR40 This directs us towards the 
governance of the regime and, more particularly, the interaction amongst stakeholders when 
assessed in terms of accountability, openness, checks and balances and the independence of 
the JAC. This encompasses both the participation-orientation of inputs and the results-
orientation of outputs in order to help us to evaluate the degree to which a set of institutional 
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arrangements²and, more particularly, the roles of judges within them²can be justified. In 
brief: the question of how much and what sort of influence judges should exercise can be 
structured by referring to those inputs, outputs and throughputs that ought to shape a well-
designed and well-functioning selection regime. In this section, I reflect on some of the ways 
that judicial influence can translate into inputs, outputs and throughputs, taking care to 
identify the many valuable contributions that judges make as well as the concerns that flow 
from those contributions. As will become clear, the inputs, outputs and throughputs of a 
selection regime (as well as the relationship of judicial influence to each) are interconnected. 
 
Inputs 
 
The starting point is to acknowledge the sound reasons that justify a measure²and perhaps 
even a large measure²of judicial input into the selection regime. Judges have a legitimate 
interest in the composition of the judiciary that justifies their involvement in individual 
appointments and the crafting of policies on the selection regime. They are well positioned to 
assess the potential judge-craft of applicants for judicial office. They bring first-hand 
knowledge of day-to-day life in courts and tribunals, and in this way can help to ensure that 
the changing demands of litigation are reflected in the blend of professional, administrative 
and personal qualities necessary for particular vacancies. Equally vital is judicial input into 
the policies on and the governance of the selection regime. Involving judges can help to foster 
their confidence (and that of the legal community) in the integrity of the selection regime. 
Importantly, it helps to ensure that judges have a stake in that regime, including shared 
responsibility for recruiting from underrepresented groups.41 Their involvement also 
minimizes the danger that other actors²and most obviously: ministers²enjoy too much 
influence.  
 
)RUDOORIWKHVHUHDVRQVLWLVXQVXUSULVLQJWKDWMXGJHVDUHµDQ[LRXV¶42 to exercise influence. 
However, it is no reflection on the judiciary if the rest of the polity is equally anxious to 
HQVXUHWKDWWKHMXGLFLDU\KDVDQDGHTXDWHLQIOXHQFHEXWQRWDµSUHGRPLQDWLQJLQIOXHQFH¶43 
Judicial influence is something to be optimized, not maximized, given the risks associated 
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with judges being too involved in the selection regime. These include the risk that a largely 
self-selecting judiciary will be self-replicating, which irrespective of the quality of the 
individuals appointed might undermine public confidence in the appointments regime as well 
as the judiciary as a whole. Judges might, in particular, seek to promote and police an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµPHULW¶WKDWRYHU-emphasizes experiences and skills which are found chiefly 
in candidates who resemble themselves. It is not inevitable that self-replication will follow 
from high levels of judicial influence, but the burden should rest on the judiciary to satisfy the 
rest of the polity that no connection exists given that it is generally assumed in merit-based 
selection processes that involving current officeholders risks a cloning effect.44 Of particular 
concern is that judges might seek to influence the selection regime in ways that lead to 
differential weight being placed on diversity for different sorts of vacancies, with more 
permissive approaches towards diversifying focused on the lower courts and tribunals.45 A 
related risk is that high levels of influence might result in appointments on the basis of 
seniority rather than merit,46 with an emphasis on attributes unrelated to judicial office, such 
DVZKHWKHUDSHUVRQVHHPVDµJRRGFKDS¶ 
 
There are, then, sound reasons to involve judges in the selection regime, but there are difficult 
questions about just how much involvement judges should have and at which stages of a 
selection exercise. It is necessary to discern proper boundaries on judicial involvement not 
merely to reduce the risks associated with disproportionate influence, but also because there 
exists broad consensus across the UK that judicial selection regimes should be inclusive and 
draw on the perspectives of the many other actors with a crucial stake in the work of the 
courts and tribunals. As noted earlier, well-LQIRUPHGDVVHVVPHQWVRIFDQGLGDWHV¶VXLWDELOLW\IRU
a judicial career should draw on the expertise, experiences and perspectives of a range of 
stakeholders. The same holds for policy decisions as well. Especially important is to involve 
ministers, lay people and lawyers.  
 
The limits on judicial inputs should be considered in light of and by reference to ministerial 
inputs, amongst other things. It is not fashionable to say as much but there are good reasons 
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 5+XQWHUµ-XGLFLDO'LYHUVLW\DQGWKH³1HZ-XGJH´¶LQ+6RPPHUODG6+DUULV-Short, S. Vaughan 
and R. Young (eds), The Futures of Legal Education and the Legal Profession, Oxford: Hart 
3XEOLVKLQJS6HHDOVR6RPPHUODGµ-XGLFLDO'LYHUVLW\&RPSOH[LW\&RQWLQXLW\DQG&KDQJH¶ 
in this collection. 
46
 See generally the evidence from other legal systems in J. Bell, Judiciaries Within Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
**HH¶-XGJLQJWKH-$&+RZ0XFK,QIOXHQFH2YHU-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV,V7RR0XFK"·LQG. Gee and E. Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial 
Appointments in an Age of Diversity (Routledge, 2017) 
  
  
for ministers to have a meaningful role in individual selections. This is especially so in 
respect of leadership roles (where judges work closely with ministers and civil servants on the 
management and funding of the judicial system) and the top courts (where judges often enjoy 
significant powers over public policy). Such reasons include that ministers can inject an 
important degree of democratic legitimacy and accountability into the selection regime²and, 
by extension, into the judiciary as an institution of government. Ministerial involvement can 
also KHOSWRIRVWHUWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VWUXVWDQGFRQILGHQFHLQWKHcourts as well as buttressing 
ministerial understanding of the constitutional roles performed by judges. Ministerial 
involvement can also furnish the political will necessary to advance the diversity agenda. 
Insofar as they tend to view courts in a wide political and social context, ministers are very 
well placed to understand the importance of diversity and the need to make rapid and visible 
progress on appointing a judiciary more reflective of society at large.47 As Andrew Lynch 
notes elsewhere in this collection, popular concern about diversity might not be evenly 
distributed throughout the electorate, and hence ministers might have an inconsistent focus on 
LWEXWWKHUHLVQHYHUWKHOHVVJRRGUHDVRQWREHOLHYHWKDWGLYHUVLW\FDQEHµDSUHVVXUHSRLQW¶IRU
politicians.48 It is also true that ministers can be held to account for the failure to make such 
progress in ways much less true of judges. This is not to deny that risks flow from ministerial 
involvement. These include, above all else, the risk that ministers might seek appointments on 
the basis of partisan factors. Ministers may also place too much weight on the need for 
selection processes to represent value for money, with the persons appointed able to begin 
judicial work immediately without long and expensive training.  
 
Questions about the appropriate levels of judicial input should also be weighed alongside lay 
and legal involvement in the selection process. With backgrounds in commerce, industry, 
academia and recruitment, lay people can bring fresh perspectives to judicial appointments. 
This has the potential to limit the scope for judges to exert disproportionate influence. Lay 
people might, for example, insist on initiatives that strengthen and further formalize selection 
processes in the face of judicial opposition.49 They could also challenge tacit understandings 
of merit by encouraging judges to acknowledge that judge-craft requires competences beyond 
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the technical legal and advocacy skills associated with excellence at the bar, but also includes 
the communication and management skills that are especially relevant for a successful career 
as a solicitor.50 Involving lawyers also ensures that the concerns of the legal professions are 
embedded in the selection regime; for example, the solicitor commissioner on the JAC is able 
to remind the other commissioners of the importance of recruiting judges from diverse 
professional backgrounds. However, just as involving other actors can counter the influence 
that judges exert, so too can their involvement actually intensify high levels of judicial 
influence. Most obviously, the involvement of lawyers on the JAC could encourage a cosy 
FRQVHQVXVZKHUHODZ\HUV¶LQWHUHVWVDOLJQZLWKMXGJHV¶LQWHUHVWVOHDGLQJWRDµVHOI-selecting 
ODZ\HUO\FDVWHRIMXGJHV¶51 FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\µWRROLWWOHKHWHURJHQHLW\RIRXWORRN¶52 Barristers, 
solicitors and legal executives will often have different interests and perspectives, but they 
might share broadly similar impulses on some issues that are a partial product of their similar 
socialization by legal education and practice. For example, they might share similar views on 
the question of whether ministers should have any real involvement in selection decisions. 
The involvement of lay people could similarly sharpen rather than shrink judicial influence 
where judges succeed in persuading lay people to advance judicial interests that are at odds 
ZLWKWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVW)RUH[DPSOHMXGJHVPLJKWVXFFHHGLQSHUVXDGLQJWKH-$&¶VOD\
commissioners of the need to select candidates with extensive experience in a fee-paid 
judicial role who require little on-the-job training from the resource-strapped Judicial College, 
even although one consequence of this might be to disadvantage candidates from non-
traditional backgrounds who tend to be less well placed to take on fee-paid judicial work 
alongside their day job.53 
 
Outputs  
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The inputs into a selection regime should be determined (at least in part) by the outputs 
sought from it. The primary outputs of a selection regime are of course the appointments 
made under it. Underlying the inclusive approach to judicial appointments now found across 
the UK lies emerging recognition of the fact that the objective is not merely to appoint well-
qualified judges. For sure, the regime must ensure that high quality individuals with the array 
of attributes necessary to excel in judicial office are appointed, with the appointment process 
sufficiently rigorous to test the professional competence of applicants, but it must do so by 
drawing on a wide range of perspectives to render it more likely that judges are recruited from 
a diverse pool, including from underrepresented groups. In other words, the people appointed 
to the bench should be very well qualified and also reflective of society at large, with the 
inputs into the selection process designed with this aim in mind. A well-functioning regime 
should also generate a number of secondary outputs. It should promote the independence of 
judges and the rule of law, in part by fostering confidence in the judicial system among key 
stakeholders. It is important to note that there might be a disjuncture between the inputs into 
the selection regime and the outputs to be secured from it. Limits on the capacity of actors 
who contribute to the selection process to achieve a more diverse bench might result from, for 
example, the statutory framework or the structure of the legal professions.54  It is notable that 
though valued as an output,55 diversity does not feature anywhere in the initial assessment of 
DFDQGLGDWH¶VµPHULW¶ in the JAC-managed regime.56 It is also of course very difficult to 
determine the quality of those ultimately appointed, especially where, as in England and 
Wales, there is no comprehensive appraisal system for reviewing the performance of serving 
judges.57  
 
When thinking about how levels of judicial influence might relate to the desired outputs of 
the selection regime, it is important to acknowledge, once again, that judicial input is essential 
for ensuring the selection of high calibre individuals who will be able to handle the demands 
of a judicial career. At the same time, it is necessary to examine how judicial interests 
correlate with the public interest. One concern is that if they make multiple, important inputs 
into the selection process, judges may repeatedly succeed in prioritizing judicial self-interest 
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over the public interest. It might be that most of the time judicial interests and the public 
interest are aligned, but there might also be occasions where judges resist initiatives that 
promote the common good. For example, some judges might resist initiatives that reflect best 
recruitment practices and which are designed to ensure a fairer, more transparent and 
inclusive process. Or to take another example: even although at some level committed to 
promoting diversity, judges might obstruct initiatives that potentially lead to faster progress 
on diversifying the bench where those initiatives imperil traditional understandings of merit.58 
While µLWFDQQRWEHLQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWWRPDUJLQDOL]HRULJQRUH¶59 the views of judges, it is 
equally important that the regime ferrets out spurious arguments advanced by judges that are 
more about entrenching vested judicial interests than furthering the public interest. 
 
Throughputs 
 
Today, the health of a selection regime will be assessed by reference to not only inputs and 
outputs, but also the quality of governance that results from the way that various key 
stakeholders interact²or what might be called the throughputs of the selection regime. A 
central concern, in other words, is that the inputs into that regime, together with the outputs 
that flow from it, should foster a way of regulating judicial appointments that is transparent, 
accountable and inclusive, with effective checks and balances to structure the contributions 
made by the various stakeholders and to ensure that no one actor has excessive influence. The 
key is to grasp how judicial involvement contributes to the governance of the selection 
regime; that is to say, to what extent do the multiple judicial inputs foster or frustrate 
transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, the independence of the JAC and, more generally, 
an appropriate balance of influence across the various stakeholders?  
 
Particular concerns will focus on the relationship between judicial influence and 
accountability. Even were it desirable to do so, it is difficult in practice to hold a decision-
maker accountable for individual appointments given that judges have security of tenure, and 
hence are normally in office for much longer than other public officials.60 There should 
always remain, however, important measures of both democratic accountability and 
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explanatory accountability for the working of the regime as a whole. Insofar as high levels of 
judicial influence might come at the cost of ministerial involvement, there is likely be a 
serious deficit in terms of democratic accountability (in the sense of important decisions 
being made by someone who is accountable to the electorate, even if only indirectly). At the 
same time, high levels of judicial influence may or may not be accompanied by an 
appropriate level of explanatory accountability (in the sense of furnishing an account of their 
collective contributions to the stewardship of the appointments regime). This depends on the 
extent to which the judges take steps to explain in what ways and to what ends they exert 
influence during a selection exercise and, more generally, on policy questions relating to the 
structure and operation of the selection regime.  
 
Another concern is whether the patterns of judicial influence might work, over time, to 
undermine the independence of the JAC. Most obviously, the views of the judicial 
commissioners on the JAC might come to dominate over those of the lay and legal members, 
with the possibility that the former co-opt the latter. More subtly, tKHQHHGIRUWKH-$&¶V
leadership to nurture the confidence of and maintain constructive relations with the judiciary 
DQGHVSHFLDOO\VHQLRUMXGJHVZLWKZKRPWKH-$&¶V&KDLUZRUNVFORVHO\might render it 
difficult at times for the JAC to distinguish between the public interest on the one hand and 
judicial interests on the other. ,WPLJKWEHFRPHGLIILFXOWIRUWKH-$&¶VOHDGHUVWRUHDOL]HWKH
full scope IRUWKH-$&¶VLQWHUHVWVDQGWKHMXGLFLDU\¶VLQWHUHVWVto conflict on issues such as 
how to frame job descriptions, the design of the qualifying tests and role-playing tasks, the 
use of interviews for senior leadership roles and the application of the equal merit provision.61 
There might also be a lack of clarity about the responsibilities of the -$&¶Vjudicial 
commissioners, and whether they owe their loyalty when discharging their role as 
commissioners to the JAC, the judiciary or the wider public.62 For this reason, it is important 
that, so far as possible, each judicial input into the selection regime is structured by a set of 
understandings shared by all of the stakeholders as to the purpose and limits of involving 
judges at specific stages of the selection process. Without such a set of understandings, there 
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is substantial scope for the judiciary to convert their multiple inputs to the selection process 
into influence that compromises WKH-$&¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH. 
 
Is there too much Judicial Influence over the JAC-run Selection Regime? 
$VQRWHGDVWKLVFKDSWHU¶VRXWVHWWKHTXHVWLRQLVQRWZKHWKHUMXGJHVVKRXOGKDYHDKLJKOHYHO
of involvement in judicial appointments, but rather when does such involvement become 
excessively high? To answer this question, I want to draw on five presumptions that, to my 
mind, can be extracted from this discussion of inputs, outputs and throughputs. Before turning 
to those presumptions, I begin by stipulating that judicial involvement in the JAC-run regime 
is, by design, fairly substantial. This stipulation should be uncontroversial. Few would deny 
that high levels of judicial involvement are embedded within the JAC regime. That judges are 
so closely involved with the selection of their colleagues is not surprising insofar as this 
acknowledges their legitimate interest in the make-up of the bench. Also relevant is that their 
heavy participation in the new methods of selecting judges was a way of addressing many 
MXGJHV¶SURIRXQGQHUYRXVQHVVLQ03 about the proposed abolition (and eventual reshaping) 
of the office of Lord Chancellor, and the consequent creation of the JAC.63 Extensive judicial 
involvement is a product of statute as well as practices that were adopted by the JAC within 
the statutory framework.64  
 
Statute and institutional practice have endowed the judiciary with considerable conduct-
shaping influence throughout the appointments process. As mentioned in the introduction, 
judges are involved at almost every stage of every JAC-managed selection exercise. For 
vacancies below the High Court, judges are involved from the very beginning (designing job 
descriptions) to the very end of the selection process (deciding whether to appoint the 
applicants recommended by the JAC). For vacancies in the High Court, Court of Appeal and 
leadership roles, judges are involved at every stage save the final decision whether or not to 
DFFHSWWKH-$&¶VUHFRPPHQGHG candidate (although, even here, the very fact that they are 
involved at all prior stages suggests that the candidates that the JAC or the ad hoc selection 
panel responsible for senior appointments ultimately recommends to the Lord Chancellor 
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likely reflect the dominant judicial views about who to appoint).65 As one commissioner put it, 
µMXGLFLDOILQJHUSULQWV¶can be found on almost all decisions in selection exercises run by or 
under the auspices of the JAC. I also stipulate that statute and institutional practice confer 
significant context-shaping influence on judges. This is a partial product of the status of, and 
respect for, the judiciary and the legal professions in England and Wales. It also results from a 
strong judicial presence on the JAC: there are more judicial than lay commissioners, with the 
number of judges and lawyers outnumbering their lay members to constitute a majority on the 
JAC. Once again, this stipulation should be uncontroversial. The question is whether their 
combined conduct-shaping and context-shaping influence gives judges too much say over 
appointments. According to one former JAC commissionerWKLVUHSUHVHQWVµVLJQLILFDQWEXW
not overwhelming LQIOXHQFH¶,GLVDJUHHDQG I now want to point to five rebuttable 
presumptions that can be taken to indicate that high levels of judicial influence over the JAC 
regime are in fact too high.  
 
1. Judicial influence is too high if judicial involvement contributes to squeezing out the scope 
for meaningful ministerial involvement. 
 
Today, the Lord Chancellor has only very minimal involvement in individual appointments.66 
Beyond specifying (in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice) the job description, the Lord 
Chancellor is no longer involved in appointments below the High Court, i.e. 97% of total 
appointments. For the High Court and above, the Lord Chancellor sets the job description 
(again in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice) and, for leadership roles, might also give 
an oral briefing to the selection panel at the outset of a selection exercise. The Lord 
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Chancellor also has the final say whether to appoint the person recommended by the JAC (or 
the ad hoc selection panels for the very top appointments), although practice over the last 
decade suggests that Lord Chancellors almost always accept the names recommended to them. 
Between 2005 and 2016, Lord Chancellors accepted the candidates that the JAC 
recommended²literally ²99.9 per cent of the time.67 Under the statute, the Lord Chancellor 
can depart from a recommendation by the JAC only if he or she is able to provide reasons that 
UDLVHGRXEWVRYHUWKHVRXQGQHVVRIWKH-$&¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHFDQGLGDWH¶VPHULW68 
According to one former office-holderµWKHGHWDLOHGZRUGLQJ>RIWKHstatute] and the 
expectations in practice make it very difficult for the Lord Chancellor to exercise even his 
OLPLWHGSRZHUV¶69 This is not to imply that a Lord Chancellor has no influence over individual 
selections. According to civil servants at the Ministry, Lord Chancellors take an interest in 
appointments, especially for leadership roles, reviewing substantial evidence compiled during 
the selection process before deciding whether or not to accept the person that the JAC has 
recommended. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that judicial influence²
throughout every stage of the process for lower level appointments and every stage for senior 
posts except the final decision²has left little if any meaningful scope for the Lord Chancellor 
to influence individual selections. To put this differently: the conduct-shaping influence of the 
judiciary within the regime is so pervasive that there remains little room for ministerial 
involvement, with even the formal powers enjoyed by the Lord Chancellor becoming in 
practice almost impossible to use, and all of this despite their being several sound reasons (as 
noted above) for retaining a meaningful ministerial input.  
 
As for policy development, the Lord Chancellor remains an important driver of reform. The 
reforms introduced in IRUH[DPSOHZHUHLQLWLDOO\SURPSWHGE\.HQQHWK&ODUNH¶VOLPLWHG
interest in lower level appointments.70 7KH/RUG&KDQFHOORUDSSURYHVWKH-$&¶VVWUDWHJLFDLPV
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and the performance and policy framework within which it operates.71 There can be little 
doubt, however, that policy development is now a collaborative enterprise, with judges 
possessing a much more significant say than a decade ago. Of note is that the MXGLFLDU\¶V 
considerable conduct-shaping influence arguably intensifies its context-shaping influence, at 
least insofar as Lord Chancellors appear to accept that the thrust of reforms to the selection 
regime should be to increase judicial responsibility for selections, rather than decrease it. The 
RYHUDOOHIIHFWRIWKHUHIRUPVZDVIRUH[DPSOHWRH[SDQGWKHMXGLFLDU\¶VLQIOXHQFHEven 
&ODUNH¶Vmodest proposal that the Lord Chancellor should sit on the panels that recommend 
candidates for the most senior vacancies was later dropped by his successor, Chris Grayling. 
Notably, there have been few attempts emanating from Lord Chancellors and the Ministry of 
Justice to ensure that judicial inputs into the appointments regime are appropriately structured 
and underpinned by shared understandings as to the purpose of and limits on those inputs. 
 
2. Judicial influence is too high if it seriously exacerbates accountability deficits in the 
selection regime. 
 
A democratic accountability deficit was almost inevitable once it was decided in 2003 to 
move from a ministerial model of appointments to one built around an independent 
appointments commission. Partial redress can perhaps be found in: the statutory duty on the 
JAC to publish an annual report;72 the practice of requiring the person nominated as WKH-$&¶V
chair to attend a pre-appointment hearing before the Justice Committee of the House of 
Commons;73 DQGWKHIDFWWKDWWKH-$&¶V&KDLU&KLHI([HFXWLYHDQGFRPPLVVLRQHUVKDYH
given evidence before select committees from time to time.74 Lord Chancellors have also 
from time to time appeared before select committees to discuss, inter alia, aspects of the 
selection regime.75 $XJPHQWLQJWKLVLVDVWDWXWRU\GXW\RQWKH/RUG&KLHI-XVWLFHWRµWDNHVXFK
VWHSV«DV>WKHRIILFHKROGHU@FRQVLGHUVDSSURSULDWHIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIHQFRXUDJLQJMXGLFLDO
GLYHUVLW\¶76 All of this might be said to offer a limited, indirect form of democratic 
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accountability²but it pales in comparison to the substantial, direct democratic accountability 
inherent in the ministerial model.77 A relevant question is whether, even taking account of 
these practices, judicial influence on the JAC-run regime is so high as to render the 
democratic deficit a serious cause for concern. Views will differ on this of course, and some 
might argue that any such deficit is more serious for some vacancies (top courts) than others 
(lower courts). A second question explores the extent to which any such democratic deficit is 
offset by WKHMXGLFLDU\¶V efforts to provide a public account of their input into the selection 
regime (explanatory accountability).  
 
On the first question, the Lord Chancellor remains formally accountable for the regime as a 
whole, but now only has very limited levers to shape individual selections, with ministerial 
input into policy cRORXUHGE\WKHMXGLFLDU\¶VFRQWH[W-shaping influence. Inasmuch as 
providing a nexus with Parliament is one of the reasons why Lord Chancellors should have a 
genuine role in shaping individual selections (as I argued above), and insofar as judicial input 
has compressed the scope for such a role, then high levels of judicial influence are 
contributing to a real democratic deficit. Reasons to believe that this represents a serious 
concern include the scale of the deficit: beyond a role in deciding the job descriptions, there is 
now no ministerial involvement in 97% of appointments, which in turn raises questions about 
the appropriateness of requiring the Lord Chancellor to remain accountable to Parliament for 
the selection regime. More generally, in the face of what some view as the rising 
constitutional power of the judiciary, it is reasonable to worry about the erosion of the 
legitimacy that traditionally flowed to the judiciary from the existence of a democratic nexus 
in the selection regime that resulted from the meaningful involvement of ministers.  
 
On the second question there is reason to doubt whether there are mechanisms in place to 
ensure the effective scrutiny of the public narrative that judges offer of the ways in which 
they exercise influence over appointments. To be sure, there is evidence that senior judges 
take seriously their responsibility to provide an official account of their stewardship of, and 
contributions to, the selection regime, for example by publishing regular reports and 
statistics.78 At the same time, there are few reliable mechanisms for holding judges to account 
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for their considerable influence over the selection regime. For example, the House of Lords 
Constitution Committee in 2012 made a number of recommendations directed towards the 
judiciary.79 It is of course always open for the Constitution Committee, or any other select 
committee, to invite senior judges to appear before them to discuss actions taken in response 
to those recommendations,80 EXW3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQWHUHVWLQjudicial appointments has been 
sporadic, with select committees not always effective at following up on their 
recommendations.81 None of this is the fault of the judges themselves, but rather is in large 
part an inevitable result of the post-2005 institutional arrangements. What is more, the 
MXGLFLDU\¶VRIILFLDODFFRXQWRIWKHLULQIOXHQFHLQHYLWDEO\RIIHUVQRLQVLJKWLQWRZKDWJRHVRQ
behind closed doors. No mention is made in such accounts of, for example, repeated judicial 
attempts to resist interviews and application forms for appointments in the Court of Appeal 
and for leadership positions, despite these forming an important and uncontroversial part of 
most professionalized appointment processes. Similarly, there is little evidence in the official 
accounts provided by the judiciary of successful judicial lobbying to dilute WKH-$&¶Vµequal 
merit¶ policy, a matter that I discuss immediately below. 
 
3. Judicial influence is too high if judges repeatedly succeed in ensuring that the public 
interest is subordinated to judicial interests. 
 
During its first decade the JAC has secured some notable policy developments in the face of 
judicial opposition. Perhaps the best example is the formalization of the process of appointing 
members of the Court of Appeal. Another success is assuming responsibility in 2013 for 
appointing Deputy High Court Judges.82 However there are also suggestions that, at various 
points during the -$&¶Vfirst ten years, judicial interests have prevailed over the public 
interest. Examples include the successful effort by the senior judiciary to resist the JAC 
assuming responsibility for the selection of the Senior Presiding Judge (a role with a wide 
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range of management, leadership and governance responsibilities).83 The most troubling 
example is, perhaps, the judicial influence that diluted WKHFRQWHQWRIWKH-$&¶Vequal merit 
policy. One of the changes introduced by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 was to clarify the 
meaning of section 63 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which provides that the JAC 
PXVWVHOHFWFDQGLGDWHVµVROHO\RQPHULW¶7KH$FWFODULILHGWKDW, where there are two or 
more candidates determined to be of equal merit, section 63 does not prevent the JAC from 
recommending a candidate on the basis of improving diversity on the bench.84 As a 
consequenceWKH-$&KDGDIUHHKDQGWRGHYLVHDSROLF\KRZEHVWWRLPSOHPHQWWKHµHTXDO
PHULW¶SURYLVLRQ 
 
In devising its equal merit policy, the JAC faced two critical questions. First, should the 
provision apply to all stages of the selection process, including short-listing, or just once at 
the final stage where the JAC makes its recommendation? Second, to which groups of under-
represented applicants should the provision apply? Alas, the JAC answered both questions 
very QDUURZO\DGRSWLQJZKDWLWVWKHQFKDLUFRQFHGHGZDVµDIDLUO\PLQLPDOLVW¶DSSURDFK85 
The JAC decided to apply the provision only at the final selection stage, thus blunting its 
potential to increase diversity. The premise that there might be candidates demonstrating 
different strengths and weaknesses who are considered of equal merit is relevant to short-
listing and at the point at which the JAC decides whom to recommend to the appointing 
authority. Indeed, it might be thought that it is at short-listing that it is most difficult to 
differentiate between the best candidates.86 Applying the equal merit policy at short-listing 
could help to remove barriers that might prevent non-conventional candidates being invited 
for an interview. The JAC further limited WKHSURYLVLRQ¶VSRWHQWLDOE\DSSOying it only to race 
and gender. It did so on the grounds that the equal merit policy should only be invoked where 
underrepresentation is evidenced by reference to published data. There are practical 
difficulties related to WKHDYDLODELOLW\RIUHOLDEOHGDWDIRUVRPHRIWKHµSURWHFWHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶
under the Equality Act. However, the JAC could have been proactive in widening the number 
of protected groups to whom the equal merit provision can apply. Arguably, a more 
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pioneHULQJDQGSURDFWLYHDSSURDFKZRXOGEHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH-$&¶VVWDWXWRU\GXW\WRµKDYH
UHJDUGWRWKHQHHGWRHQFRXUDJHGLYHUVLW\LQWKHUDQJHRISHUVRQVDYDLODEOHIRUVHOHFWLRQ¶87 
 
What bears emphasis, for these purposes, is that judicial influence accounWVIRUWKH-$&¶V
QDUURZHTXDOPHULWSROLF\-XGJHVH[HUFLVHGVLJQLILFDQWVZD\RYHUWKHGHVLJQRIWKH-$&¶V
policy. Over half of the responses to a consultation exercise on the equal merit policy that the 
JAC ran in 2013 were from judges and their representative bodies. There were also lengthy 
private discussions between the JAC, senior judges and the Ministry. As the then JAC Chair 
H[SODLQHGWKHUHZDVµVHULRXVFDXWLRQDPRQJPDQ\>RIWKH-$&¶V@VWDNHKROGHUV¶DERXWWKH
equal merit policy.88 Confidential interviews with some of those involved in the design of the 
policy confirm that it primarily was to meet judicial anxiety that the JAC adopted such an 
anaemic policy. There is also evidence of judicial resistance to the policy in the years 
following its adoption. According to one interviewee who is closely involved in appointments 
process, some judicial commissioners on the JAC fiercely resisted an internal report that 
recommended that the JAC should extend the equal merit policy to the short-listing stage. In 
aOORIWKLVLWVHHPVWKDWVRPHMXGJHV¶DWWDFKPHQWWR a traditional account of merit²and, in 
particular, to the view that it will always be possible to distinguish between two candidates ²
is trumping the -$&¶VFRQFHUQ for faster progress on diversity.89 To grasp the potential of the 
equal merit policy requires a certain attitude about the type of assessments made by selection 
panels when faced with two or more candidates with different but commensurable judicial 
qualities²and, more significantly, a change of attitude amongst some judges who serve on or 
seek to influence the JAC. In short: judicial influence inside the JAC and external pressure 
brought to bear on it by senior judges and judicial associations has led to a weak policy that 
µUXQVWKHULVNRIPDUNing merely another positive headline backed by very little positive 
LPSDFWLQWHUPVRIDGGUHVVLQJWKHJODULQJGLYHUVLW\GHILFLW¶90 The evidence, to date, suggests 
that judicial influence succeeded in minimizing the impact of the equal merit provision: the 
JAC made 306 recommendations for judicial office in 2015-16, but invoked the provision a 
mere 14 times.91  
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4. Judicial influence is too high where this has enabled judicial involvement to be essentially 
unstructured, lacking transparency and not subject to effective checks. 
 
Arguably, academic critiques about judicial influence over the JAC-run regime ²including 
the critique in the book that I co-DXWKRUHGZLWK+D]HOO0DOOHVRQDQG2¶%ULHQ²have to date 
understated the importance of ensuring that, so far as possible, judicial inputs into the 
selection process are structured, transparent and subject to effective checks. From its 
inception in 2006, the JAC has sought to ensure a structured selection process; emphasising, 
for example, that interviews should follow a set format that enables evidence to be assessed 
against explicitly stated criteria for appointment, with this designed in part to counter the risk 
of judges appealing to implicit criteria that form no part of a merit-based selection process.92 
Academic critiques have always not done enough to acknowledge the important work that 
undertaken by the JAC on its creation in 2006 to ensure a structured and open appointment 
process. A related shortcoming of academic critiques has been to overlook the important steps 
taken by the JAC and others to structure some of the judicial inputs into the selection process 
since 2006. For example, the JAC in 2015 sought to address the potential for conflicts that 
can arise where judges undertake multiple roles in a single selection round (as panel member, 
statutory consultee, referee and so forth).93 Similarly, in the face of concern that judicial 
commissioners tended to enjoy longer terms on the JAC than their non-judicial counterparts, 
the JAC, the Ministry of Justice and senior judges QRZVKDUHµDQH[SHFWDWLRQ¶94 that there 
should be consistent tenures for both judicial and non-judicial commissioners alike. These are 
very welcome developments that should be kept in mind when assessing the degree and 
nature of judicial influence on the JAC and its selection processes. 
 
Despite these important steps, there is still more work to be done to ensure that judicial 
contributions are structured and subject to effective checks. A particular problem is the risk 
that judges will enjoy excessive influence through statutory consultation; that is, where the 
JAC is required by statute to seek the views of senior judges on the shortlisted candidates 
before making its recommendation. EviGHQFHWKDW+D]HOO0DOOHVRQ2¶%ULHQDQG,FROODWHG
between 2011 and 2014 suggests that the views of senior judges expressed via statutory 
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consultation carries substantial weight, with that weight increasing with the seniority of the 
vacancy in question. Further confidential interviews between 2014 and 2017 confirmed 
continued concerns amongst some inside the JAC about the quality of and weight attached to 
the judicial views expressed during statutory consultation. My co-authors and I concluded 
that statutory consultation sometimes operates as a de facto µveto¶ for senior judges on the 
people that the JAC recommends, which led us to worry that statutory consultation gives 
judges too much influence.95 As the JAC see its, however, the weight ascribed to the views 
H[SUHVVHGLQVWDWXWRU\FRQVXOWDWLRQLVµGLUHFWO\SURSRUWLRQDWHWRWKHTXDOLW\RIWKRVHUHDVRQV
ZKLFKLVJHQHUDOO\KLJK¶96 What is more, when compared with the typically decisive say that 
judges possessed via secret soundings under the pre-2005 regime, it could perhaps be 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWµ>W@he relative weight of MXGLFLDOFRQVXOWDWLRQLVERXQGWREHVPDOOHU«DQGLWV
REMHFWLYLW\HDVLHUWRDVVHVV¶LQWKHIRUPDODQGWUDQVSDUHQWDSSOLFDWLRQV-based regime run by 
WKH-$&ZKHUHµWKHUDQJHRI information available about candidates is much wider, and 
ODUJHO\LQWKHKDQGVRIWKHFDQGLGDWHWKHPVHOYHV¶97 Although there might be something in this, 
as of 2016, there remains very real (if not always explicitly stated) concern among some in 
both the JAC and the Ministry about the quality, consistency and relevance of the views that 
senior judges express during statutory consultation.98 As one civil servant at the Ministry put 
LWVWDWXWRU\FRQVXOWDWLRQKDVDUROHWRSOD\EHFDXVHVHQLRUMXGJHVµNQRZWKHMREDQGWKH\NQRZ
thHSHRSOH¶EXWWKHNH\LVWRHQVXUHWKDWMXGJHVµJLYHEHWWHUDQGPRUHFRQVLVWHQWHYLGHQFHLQ
VWDWXWRU\FRQVXOWDWLRQDQGIROORZDFRQVLVWHQWDSSURDFK¶ 
 
5. Judicial influence is too high if judges succeed in co-opting other stakeholders, including 
in ZD\VWKDWXQGHUPLQHWKH-$&¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH 
 
The JAC must be independent not only from the Ministry of Justice, but from the judiciary as 
well. It is true, of course, that judges have a critical role to play in promoting and protecting 
WKH-$&¶VLQGHSHQGHnce. Indeed, the then Lord Chief Justice, Igor Judge, is credited with 
robustly defending the JAC in 2010 after tensions with the Ministry became so fraught that 
there were rumours that the JAC might be abolished just a matter of years after its birth.99 
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However, whether by design or otherwise, judges can wield influence that undermines that 
LQGHSHQGHQFH-XGLFLDOLQIOXHQFHWKDWXQGHUPLQHVWKH-$&¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHis difficult to 
detect and calls for constant vigilance. It includes (but is not limited to) co-oSWLQJWKH-$&¶V
leadership, commissioners and staff. In short, the risk of judicial capture of the JAC is real. 
Over its first decade, this risk has ebbed and flowed, with at least occasional concern inside 
some parts of the JAC that judicial influence was undermining WKH-$&¶V independence. 
Three issues deserve emphasis.  
 
First, some of those most closely involved in the -$&¶Vwork expressed concern in 
confidential interviews that each of the -$&¶VILUVWWZROD\FKDLUV²Baroness Prashar (from 
2006 to 2010) and Christopher Stephens (from 2010 to 2016)²sometimes seemed to have 
been co-opted by the senior judiciary. (QVXULQJWKDWWKH-$&¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHLVQRW
FRPSURPLVHGE\MXGLFLDOFDSWXUHDUHDPRQJWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVRIWKH-$&¶s 
leadership (the Chair and the Chief Executive).100 Of course, the lay Chairs find themselves in 
an especially delicate position, requiring a range of administrative, diplomatic and political 
skills to foster and maintain the confidence of multiple stakeholders (ministers, judges, civil 
servants as well as the various legal professions), each of which might have competing 
concerns. On his appointment in 2011, Christopher Stephens found confidence in the JAC 
amongst ministers and senior judges at dangerously low levels. It would be understandable if 
the Chairs were JHQHUDOO\V\PSDWKHWLFWRWKHMXGLFLDU\¶VSHUVSHFWLYHVRQFRQtentious questions. 
After all, the judiciary has an important say in the selection of the Chair,101 and might be keen 
to ensure that a suitably sympathetic candidate is selected to lead the JAC. Furthermore, 
VHQLRUMXGJHVKDYHDPSOHRSSRUWXQLW\WRµOREE\¶WKH-$&¶V&KDLUDQGLQIOXHQFHKLVRUKHU
mindset. NRWRQO\GRHVWKH-$&¶V&KDLUKDYHUHJXODURQH-to-one meetings with the Lord 
Chief Justice to discuss the appointments regime, he or she also participates alongside senior 
judges on panels that select the members of the Court of Appeal, heads of division and 
judicial leaders such as the Lord Chief Justice.102 It would be unsurprising if this close and 
repeated contact with senior judges led some Chairs over time to share the judicial approach 
on contentious policy questions. 
 
Second, there is some concern that the senior judges who sit as commissioners on the JAC 
have at times exerted disproportionate influence on both individual selections and the 
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IDVKLRQLQJRIWKH-$&¶VSROLFLHV$FFRUGLQJWRRQHRIILFLDOsome of the more junior judges on 
the JAC have at times VHHPHGWRµWDNH WKHLUOHDG¶RQFRQWHQWLRXVSROLF\TXHVWLRQVIURPWKH
senior judicial commissioners. An example cited in support of this by the same official was 
concerted judicial opposition to the JA&¶VGHVLUHWRVWUHQJWKHQLWVHTXDOPHULWSROLF\Concern 
has also been voiced about significant spikes in judicial influence over the JAC that occurred 
in 2010 and 2016 when WKHVHQLRUMXGLFLDOFRPPLVVLRQHUVHUYHGDVWKH-$&¶Vacting chair 
pending the appointment of a new lay chair. A particular concern is that these periods of 
interregnum provided an opportunity for these judges to entrench high levels of judicial 
LQIOXHQFHRYHUWKH-$&¶V processes.  
 
Finally, WKHUHLVFRQFHUQDERXWZKHWKHUWKH-$&¶Vlay and legal commissioners might be 
deferential to the judicial commissioners, both on decisions relating to individual 
appointments and policy questions. Similarly, in respect of selection days for lower level 
vacancies, there are concerns about that judicial members on the interview panels might have 
DQRYHUVL]HGLQIOXHQFH7REHFOHDULQLWVHDUO\GD\VRQHRIWKH-$&¶VSULRULWLHVZDVµWR
HQVXUHWKDW>WKHFRPPLVVLRQHUV@ZRUNHGDVDFRKHVLYHJURXS¶DQGµWRHQVXUHSDULW\DPRQJWKH
commissioners so that tKHUHZDVQRGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQOD\DQGMXGLFLDOPHPEHUV¶103 
(PSKDVLVZDVDOVRSODFHGGXULQJ&KULVWRSKHU6WHYHQV¶VWHQXUHDV&KDLUWRHQVXUHWKDWDOO
decisions were reached by consensus, reflecting the informed view of all of the 
Commissioners. In several of the interviews that I have conducted with commissioners over 
the last five years, it has been repeatedly emphasized that every commissioner enjoys the 
same say, with no discernible difference between how lay, legal or judicial commissioners 
contribute to WKH-$&¶VGHFLVLRQV104 There is, according to many of those involved with the 
work of the JAC, no evidence of any deference to the judicial commissioners. As Geoffrey 
Bindman QC and Karon Monaghan QC have noted, however, there is reason to be (at the 
very OHDVWµDOLWWOHVFHSWLFDORIWKLV¶E\YLUWXHRIµWKHDXWKRULW\LQKHUHQWLQWKHLUVWDWXV¶
WRJHWKHUZLWKWKHLUµH[SHULHQFHRIGRLQJWKHMRELWVHOI¶WKHMXGLFLDOFRPPLVVLRQHUVDUHµOLNHO\
LQSUDFWLFHWREHYHU\LQIOXHQWLDO¶105  
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And, indeed, some interviewees with very good knowledge of the internal workings of the 
-$&¶VSURFHVVHVKDYHFRQFHGHGLQSULYDWHWKDWLWFDQEHH[FHSWLRQDOO\GLIILFXOWIRUWKHOD\
commissioners to challenge the views of judicial commissioners and²in particular²senior 
judges, both on questions of policy and in respect of individual selection decisions. There is 
usually no suggestion of any outright, explicit deference shown to the judicial commissioners 
(although at least one interviewee felt browbeaten by some senior judges in one selection 
round). However, several interviewees have spoken of the role of the lay commissioners in 
ways that suggests that they perform a limited, secondary role of corroborating the 
assessments of candidates made by judicial commissioners, with this especially notable in 
descriptions of selection exercises for senior roles. To be clear, even when performing this 
corroborating role, lay commissioners can play a vital role in ensuring that fair, open and 
evidence-based decisions are made. However, a corroborating role is likely to mean that there 
will be no real difference in the type of appointments made (especially to senior positions), 
with traditional understandings of merit prevailing.106 This is significant insofar as the 
independence of the JAC is undermined, in a very real sense, if the lay commissioners 
become captured by an interpretation of merit that is advanced by judges in the name of their 
vested interests rather than the public interest.107 Even strong and impressive lay 
commissioners with stellar professional careers can lack a coordinated and coherent approach 
to policy on appointments. The solution is not to dispense with lay involvement on the JAC, 
but rather to adopt a realistic approach to their ability to act as an effective counter to high 
levels of judicial influence. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been threefold. First, it has sought to promote a more 
structured debate about judicial influence over judicial appointments by providing some tools 
for assessing when that influence becomes too high. The starting point, I suggested, is to 
consider influence in terms of conduct-shaping and context-shaping. I then explained how the 
MXGLFLDU\¶V conduct-shaping and context-shaping influence must be evaluated by reference to 
the inputs, outputs and throughputs of a well-designed and well-functioning appointment 
regime. From reflecting on those inputs, outputs and throughputs, it is possible to point to five 
rebuttable presumptions that suggest that the judiciary exerts too much influence. Second, I 
have sought to use these presumptions to substantiate and add depth to claims made by a 
handful of academics over the last decade that judges now exercise too much influence under 
the JAC regime. Third, in all of this, the overriding objective has been less to persuade the 
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main stakeholders in the selection regime that such academic critiques are necessarily correct, 
but rather to help bridge a gulf between academics on the one hand and judges, the JAC and 
officials on the other about why it is important to debate the levels of judicial influence. In 
short: the goal has been to help stakeholders recognize and remedy the fact that this is a 
GHEDWHWKDWKDVEHHQODUJHO\QHJOHFWHGGXULQJWKH-$&¶VILUVWGHFDGHMoreover, as debates 
about the need for an independent judicial appointment body heats up in common law 
countries such as Australia and Canada, there are lessons to be drawn from the experience in 
England and Wales, both about the levels of judicial influence and²perhaps as importantly 
²about the difficulty of furnishing a constructive debate about that influence. 
 
I have deliberately framed the five presumptions as rebuttable. This recognizes that debates 
about influence in the real world are inevitably highly contextual. Abstract propositions about 
what may or may not constitute excessive influence can only ever be the starting point for 
debate. It is vital to attend to the unique circumstances in the judicial system at hand, always 
recognizing that levels of influence will be a product of multiple factors, not all of which 
directly relate to judges themselves. It might be, for example, that the levels of judicial 
influence need to be reconsidered if the institutional dynamics in the selection regime do not 
operate as envisaged. In the JAC regime, high levels of judicial influence are mandated by 
statute, and are thus DQLPSRUWDQWH[SUHVVLRQRI3DUOLDPHQW¶VZLOO<HWLQSUDFWLFHMXGJHV
exercise much more influence than Parliament intended, partly because successive Lord 
Chancellors have participated much less fully than anticipated, and also partly because checks 
on judicial influence are arguably less effective than envisaged (e.g. the scale of judicial 
involvement on the JAC regime is not counterbalanced by the input of the JAC¶VOD\DQGOHJDO
commissioners). It is also important to keep in mind that the cumulative level of judicial 
influence might be too high even if no one instance of judicial involvement is objectionable 
when viewed in isolation. There is of course room to debate whether any instance of judicial 
involvement is desirable on its own terms (e.g. whether it is desirable for the Lord Chief 
Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals to have the final say over such a large proportion 
of selections given that this arguably intensifies an acute deficit in democratic accountability). 
Yet, even if each and every instance of involvement might be justifiable when view in 
isolation, the combined effect of the involvement that is ingrained throughout the selection 
regime might lead to the conclusion that judges have excessive influence. Put differently, 
these presumptions represent a beginning rather than an end to debate about levels of judicial 
influence. But it is a debate that, in the JAC regime, is overdue. 
 
 
 
